Introduction
The current standard algorithm for genearting Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) produces sequences that are trivially predicable by off-path attackers The security implications of predictable TCP sequence numbers have been known for a long time (e.g., Morris paper in 1985) RFC 1948 [Bellovin, 1996] proposed an algorithm for selecting ISNs such that they are not easily predictable by off-path attackers
RFC 1948
Proposed to generate ISNs with: ISN = M + F(localhost, localport, remotehost, remoteport) Where M is a timer, and F is suggested to be a cryptographic hash function such as MD5 This expression leads to monotonically-increasing ISNs that are unpredictable by off-path attackers RFC 1948 was published as an Informational RFC It has been widely implemented and deployed
draft-gont-tcpm-rfc1948bis
New document aims at Standards Track (rather than Informational):
TCP SHOULD generate its Initial Sequence Numbers with the expression: ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport)
The discussion of address-based trust relationship attacks IN rfc 1948 was updated to reflect current attack scenarios, and moved to an Appendix. Documentation of an old BSD bug was also moved to an Appendix In version -00 of the document, the recommended hash algorithm had been changed to This had been motivated by non-technical reasons Based on later discussions on the mailing-list, we will switch back to MD5 in the next revision
